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I. INTRODUCTION
You can’t beat something with nothing. That simple proposition
helps explain the difficulty that death penalty opponents have faced
in the campaign to abolish capital punishment. Although four states
in recent years have moved forward with abolition, the majority of
states continue to maintain capital punishment.1 Across the nation,

Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks are due to my research
assistants, Max Compton and Meghan Jones, for their diligent research on this project.
1. Illinois (2011), New Mexico (2009), New Jersey (2007), and New York (2007) were the most
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the death penalty remains politically popular, and many who support
the death penalty do so convinced that convicted capital murderers
deserve to die.2 Still, the tide seems to be turning. Overall, the
number of death sentences imposed per year has fallen in half from
the 1990s, and polls indicate that support for the death penalty given
an alternative option of life without parole has dropped.3
Popular unease with capital punishment stems in part from its
burdensome cost and in part from the increasing public awareness of
the criminal justice system’s potential to convict the innocent.4 The
new awareness of the risks of capital punishment combined with the
emerging consensus for leaner, less punitive, and more cost-effective
punishment policies is promising to tip the balance. As James
Liebman observed more than a decade ago, “conservative
commentators who have in the past supported the death penalty have
recently come out in favor of measures to check government power
in this context, with some even urging abolition.”5 This emerging
consensus creates a rare opportunity for meaningful dialogue about
major reform of the death penalty.
What is needed to push the debate to the next stage is a reform
proposal that achieves the moral, political, and economic gains
identified by death-penalty opponents while retaining the retributive,
recent states to abolish capital punishment. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death penalty
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
2. Death Penalty Issues, PRO-DEATH PENALTY.COM, http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/issues.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (“Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves
so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.” (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976))); see also Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public
Opinion On The Death Penalty—It’s Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1460 (1998)
(reporting Gallup poll results showing that 50% of death penalty supporters stated that retribution, “a
life for a life,” was the strongest reason for their support).
3. Scott Turow, The Death of the Death Penalty, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2011, at 46.
4. See Jay D. Aronson & Simon Cole, Science and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, and the
Debate over Capital Punishment in the United States, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603, 604 (2009) (stating
that “over the past decade innocence has emerged as perhaps the dominant issue in death penalty
discourse with ‘an unprecedented effect on the debate about capital punishment’” (quoting Susan A.
Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 8 (2008))).
5. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing
Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1194–95 (2009) (citing James S. Liebman,
The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2140 n.264 (2000)).
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incapacitative, and deterrent effects promised by contemporary death
penalty practices. I present one such alternative here. In this Article, I
argue that states should abandon their current dysfunctional deathpenalty systems in favor of a new ultimate sentence: death-in-prison.
A sentence of death-in-prison would be exactly what it says: a
prisoner sentenced to death-in-prison would be incarcerated for the
duration of his or her natural life. Death-in-prison sentences would be
like sentences of life in prison without possibility of parole
(“LWOP”) in that they would entail lifetime incarceration but no
affirmative state action to terminate the prisoner’s life. Like LWOP, a
sentence of death-in-prison would condemn its recipient to die
without any chance of release or reintegration into the community.
Death-in-prison sentences would also share several features of the
conventional death penalty. As with the conventional death penalty, a
special penalty trial would be needed to impose the ultimate death-inprison sentence. In addition, persons sentenced to death-in-prison
might continue to serve their sentences in special segregated “death
rows.”6 Death-in-prison sentences would also be imposed with all the
magisterial weightiness of conventional death sentences. Persons so
sentenced would be told, like those in conventional death penalty
states, that the punishment for their crime is the ultimate one—death.
Although largely symbolic, the expressive value of imposing a death
sentence, rather than a life sentence, may be the proposal’s greatest
strength.
Death-in-prison would thus not constitute a watershed change in
our penal practices. As others already have recognized, LWOP itself
is a kind of death sentence.7 My proposal begins by acknowledging
this truth while also recognizing the powerful retributive symbolism

6. Preservation of death row is not an essential feature of the proposal. Research literature suggests
that the current practice of segregating death-row prisoners is inordinately costly, harmful to prisoners
and correctional facility staff, and unnecessary in terms of facility security. Accordingly, I do not
recommend retention of segregated death rows unless doing so is the only politically feasible way to win
support of the proposal.
7. See generally Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole, America’s
Other Death Penalty: Notes on Life Under Sentence of Death by Incarceration, 88 THE PRISON J. 328
(2008), available at http://tpj.sagepub.com/content/88/2/328.full.pdf+html.
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that accompanies the pronouncement upon a convicted murderer of a
sentence of death.
Replacement of the conventional death penalty with a new deathin-prison sentence has much to commend it. It would save money,
enhance equity among offenders, eliminate the risk of wrongful
executions, and increase the odds that persons wrongfully convicted
of capital crimes can obtain eventual redress. Death-in-prison would
also increase the sense of “closure” and reduce years of stress and
uncertainty felt by victims’ families awaiting imposition of capital
sentences without reducing either the retributive or deterrent
functions of punishment. The death-in-prison penalty would also
redirect jurors’ attention to what should be the ultimate inquiry in
capital cases: whether the perpetrator on trial might be rehabilitated,
or instead permanently removed from civil society. For these reasons,
jurisdictions that currently retain the death penalty should abandon
their outmoded capital punishment apparatus in favor of a new,
death-in-prison penalty.
The argument unfolds as follows. Part II discusses the primary
rationales advanced by supporters of the current death penalty,
demonstrates why the death penalty as currently fashioned fails to
deliver on those rationales, and explains why death-in-prison would
better serve penological interests. In addition, it documents the
substantial cost savings that abolition of the conventional death
penalty would make possible. Part III identifies two particular ways
that replacement of the current death penalty with death-in-prison
would improve criminal justice. First, death-in-prison would shift
capital decision-makers’ focus away from whether the defendant
lives or dies to what the key moral issue in the penalty phase of
capital cases should be: whether the perpetrator should be
temporarily or permanently excluded from civil society. By focusing
the penalty phase jury on that issue, using death-in-prison sentences
as the highest ultimate penalty advances and clarifies the jury’s moral
decision-making function. Second, replacing conventional death
sentences with death-in-prison might help trigger a downward

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/5
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ratcheting of sentences across the board, which our overburdened
criminal justice system desperately needs. Part IV briefly concludes.
II. “DEATH-IN-PRISON” SENTENCES WOULD BETTER SERVE
PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS THAN THE DYSFUNCTIONAL
CONTEMPORARY DEATH PENALTY
The modern American death penalty is a “peculiar institution,” in
more ways than one.8 Death penalty supporters cite an array of
justifications for keeping the institution, but after years of heated
study and debate, there remains little, if any, evidence that the death
penalty actually serves any of those purposes more effectively than
alternate available punishments. While retribution and deterrence are
generally cited as the two principal justifications for the death
penalty,9 other justifications frequently invoked by supporters include
the need for “closure” by family members and friends of the victim,
the need to express the moral indignation and outrage of the
community, the need to educate citizens about community norms and
values, and the need to diffuse popular anger in order to foreclose
resort to vigilante justice by outraged community members.
Whether the death penalty could, in theory, provide these benefits
under the right conditions is debatable. What is not debatable is that,
as currently practiced, the death penalty’s efficacy is deeply
compromised. The death penalty’s inability to achieve the
penological goals its advocates identify can be blamed on three
features of modern capital punishment. First, the death penalty is
very rarely imposed, and when it is imposed, death sentences are
very rarely carried out. Second, even when a death sentence is both
imposed and carried out, the typical period of delay between
sentencing and execution is so great that it undermines many of the
stated purposes of capital punishment. Third, regardless of whether
death sentences ultimately are carried out, residual uncertainty about
8. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF
ABOLITION (2011).
9. In Gregg v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court identified retribution and deterrence as the two
penal objectives of the death penalty. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
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the prisoner’s guilt, combined with substantial opposition to the use
of the penalty, greatly dilutes the punishment’s efficacy and distracts
the public from what is intended to be a powerful and expressive
“teaching moment.” An ultimate sentence of death-in-prison, in
contrast, would not suffer these defects, and as a result would provide
a better, fairer, and cheaper alternative than the dysfunctional
contemporary death penalty.
A. Infrequency
The death penalty today is an exercise in symbolism. Compared
with the number of homicides committed each year, the number of
persons sentenced to death is “vanishingly small,”10 and the number
of persons actually executed smaller still. Only one in thirty-three
persons convicted of a homicide offense is sentenced to death.
Among persons convicted of murder, approximately one in five
receives a death sentence. In contrast, large numbers of defendants—
approximately ten times as many—are being sentenced to terms of
life without chance of parole,11 and approximately forty times more
are serving life sentences of one sort or another.12 Even among those
relative few who are sentenced to death, only a small handful are
actually executed. Currently, more than 3,300 inmates are housed on
death row awaiting execution. In comparison, an average of fortyfour persons were executed each year during the last four years. One
recent study estimated that “less than 10 percent of all offenders on
death row are ultimately executed.”13
Those small numbers mean that many, perhaps most, of the most
culpable killers receive less than the state’s highest penalty. The rare,
10. Franklin E. Zimring & David T. Johnson, The Dark at the Top of the Stairs: Four Destructive
Influences of Capital Punishment on American Criminal Justice 737 (Working Paper Series), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956686 (quoting GARLAND, supra note 8).
11. According to Adam Liptak, approximately 28% of the nation’s 132,000 prisoners serving life
sentences are ineligible for parole. See Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind
Bars,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
2,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/02life.web.html?pagewanted=all.
12. Id.
13. David Jacobs et al., Who Survives on Death Row? An Individual and Contextual Analysis, 72
AM.
SOC.
REV.
610,
610
(2007),
available
at
http://www.joinaclu.org/pdfs/capital/report_who_surviveson_deathrow.pdf.
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selective use of the death penalty to punish “the worst of the worst”
might be acceptable, were the death penalty used for that purpose.
But it is not used in that way. Study after study concludes that the
class of persons sentenced to death, and the class of persons actually
executed, is not distinguishable, in terms of blameworthiness of the
offenders or egregiousness of the crimes committed, from the class of
persons sentenced to life without parole or who receive death
sentences but are never executed. As a result, similarly situated
offenders regularly are subject to varying penalties: some are
sentenced to death, others to life without parole, still others live their
entire lives on death row and die there of natural causes. Sometimes
the differences are caused by choices to resolve a case through plea
bargaining. In other cases, extremely culpable offenders are spared
the death penalty because someone in the system—a prosecutor,
juror, or judge—had qualms about authorizing an execution. At the
same time, far less culpable defendants are routinely sentenced to die
because the decision makers lacked these moral qualms or refused to
make plea offers. As a result, there is little rhyme or reason to the
sorting process. Indeed, studies indicate that death sentences are just
as arbitrary in their imposition today as they were before Furman v.
Georgia was decided.14
Infrequent use of the death penalty undermines its retributive and
deterrent qualities in important ways. The distribution of punishment
is an important feature of justice, and where its distribution is
uneven, the criteria determining the distribution takes on particular
salience. A substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that
factors irrelevant to desert, including race, gender, intrastate
geography, election-year politics, and the quality of defense counsel

14. See David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes: Evidence from the Popular Press that Death
Sentencing Continues to be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary More than Three Decades After Furman, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 797, 806–07 (2005); Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return
to Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255 (2011); N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY
COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 31, 50 (2007), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf (“[T]he risk remains that similar murder cases
are being treated differently in the death penalty context thereby elevating the probability that the death
penalty is being administered ‘freakishly’ and arbitrarily.”).
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play a significant role in determining who is sentenced to death.15 If,
as the evidence suggests, the criteria most often determinative of who
lives and who dies lacks moral relevance to punishment, it is hard to
argue that the system is meeting its retributive goals.16 Moreover,
proportionality is a concept central to retributive punishment, and
where the distribution of offenders’ punishment is disproportionate to
the distribution of offenders’ culpability, the penal system is clearly
failing to achieve basic retributive goals.17
At the same time, there is little reason to believe that executions,
which occur with less frequency than lightning strikes, have much of
a deterrent impact.18 Indeed, a robust debate about whether the death
penalty in fact deters crime has been ongoing for decades without
any resolution. The roots of the debate can be traced back to a 1975
study published by Isaac Erlich.19 In the study, Erlich claimed that
each execution deters seven or eight murders.20 The study received a
substantial amount of attention at the time. Erlich’s conclusions were
discredited, however, by a panel of the National Academy of Science
15. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1638, 1651 (1998) (finding that blacks are more than four times as likely as whites to be sentenced to
death); Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367
(1991) (finding that females were less likely to receive death sentence than males where crimes were
comparably severe); Markel, infra note 17, at 458 (noting a finding by Illinois commission that “many
offenders sentenced to death row were there because of morally irrelevant factors such as . . . intrastate
geography”); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1993).
16. See Laura M. Argys & H. Naci Mocan, Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die? An Analysis of
Prisoners on Death Row in the United States, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 255 (2004) (reporting results of
study on executions of death row inmates finding that primary factors determining who is executed are
“the race and gender of the inmate, the race and political affiliation of the governor, and whether the
governor is a lame duck”).
17. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 458 (2005) (characterizing
“desire to avoid arbitrariness in the distribution of the death penalty” as a “core commitment[] of a
liberal legal conception of retributivism”); Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29
U. DAYTON L. REV. 335, 340 (2004) (arguing that one of the five criteria of retributive justice is that
“[i]t is done consistently for similar cases and hence is predictable”).
18. See Sara Colón, Comment, Capital Crime: How California’s Administration of the Death
Penalty Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2009) (citing meteorological
records indicating that more people have died of lightning strikes in California than by execution).
19. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
20. See id.
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chaired by a Nobel-winning economist, which found flaws in Erlich’s
methodology, including the fact that the decline Erlich observed in
the murder rate in states implementing capital punishment occurred
as well in states that did not authorize capital punishment.21 The
panel concluded that “the available studies provide no useful
evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.”22
More recent studies have claimed to find evidence of a deterrent
effect of capital punishment as well. One study asserted that each
execution deters eighteen murders.23 But these studies, too, have been
scrutinized by other economists who have found the analysis
flawed.24 Indeed, competing studies purport to establish that
executions not only do not deter, they increase the homicide rate.25
Needless to say, the debate over the death penalty’s deterrent effect
remains, at best, undetermined. As Michael Tonry puts it, “[t]he only
credible conclusions that can be drawn are either that capital
punishment has no deterrent effects on homicide or that there is no
credible evidence that it does.”26

21. See William Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp. v. Ohio, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 706–07
(2011) (citing John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, The Death Penalty: No Evidence for Deterrence,
ECONOMISTS’
VOICE,
Apr.
2006,
at
1–2,
available
at
http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/contentUri?format=INT&t:ac=j$
002fev.2006.3.5$002fev.2006.3.5.1170$002fev.2006.3.5.1170.xml).
22. Id. at 707 (citing PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT & INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 9 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978)).
23. Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital Punishment Have a
Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Post-Moratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344, 344
(2003).
24. See, e.g., Jongmook Choe, Another Look at the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 1 J.
ADVANCED RES. L. & ECON. 12 (2010) (finding that the death penalty does not have a homicide
reducing effect); Tomislav V. Kovandzic, Lynne M. Vieraitis & Denise Paquette Boots, Does the Death
Penalty Save Lives?, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 803 (2009) (finding no empirical support, based on
well-known econometric procedures for panel data analysis, for the argument that the existence or
application of the death penalty deters prospective offenders from committing homicide); John Donohue
& Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 791 (2005).
25. Michael J. Godfrey & Vincent Schiraldi, The Death Penalty May Increase Homicide Rates, in
DOES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DETER CRIME? 47, 50 (Stephen E. Schonebaum ed., 1998); see also
Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003).
26. Michael Tonry, Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research, 37 CRIME & JUST. 279,
283 (2008).
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Of course, it is possible that notwithstanding the absence of
empirical evidence, the death penalty does have a deterrent effect.
Numerous people, including Supreme Court Justices, have assumed
as much. Even if we assume as a matter of “common sense” that the
current death penalty has some marginal deterrent effect,27 basic
behavioral theory suggests that the effect is compromised by the
infrequency of the death penalty’s use. In his influential tract on
punishment, Cesare Beccaria long ago pointed out that certainty is
more important than severity where deterrence is concerned. Recent
studies on cognitive psychology confirm this observation.28
Where punishment is severe, there is less chance that policy
makers will exercise their discretion to carry out the punishment. In
addition, punishment that is perceived to be overly harsh risks delegitimizing the state in the eyes of citizens.29 We can observe both
of these dynamics at work in capital punishment. Many of the most
culpable offenders escape the death penalty, not because they do not
deserve the highest punishment available, but because the relevant
decision-makers are reluctant to impose it. Likewise, where the death
penalty is utilized, it plainly undermines the state’s lawful authority
in the eyes of some citizens. Although the use of the death penalty
also advances the political standing of politicians in the eyes of
others, it is far from clear that these costs and benefits are
commensurate. Politicians may be trading short-term political appeal
for long-term disaffection among substantial numbers of citizens. In
any event, when the use of a punishment as politically controversial
as the death penalty is at issue, the application of the penalty will
27. Proponents of the death penalty frequently make this assertion, but not everyone agrees with this
“common sense” premise. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death
Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 581–82 (2004) (arguing that death penalty provides no marginal
increase in deterrence over threat of life imprisonment because most offenders either do not believe they
will be detected or do not care). It is also quite possible that the death penalty does not provide any
greater deterrent than lesser threats.
28. Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,
81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 544–47 (1973) (finding that the certainty of punishment had greater deterrent
impact than severity of punishment). The same insight has been asserted by law and economics scholars.
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 178
(1968) (asserting the same).
29. Guyora Binder makes these observations about Beccaria’s views, with elaboration, in Guyora
Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 335–36 (2002).
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ultimately turn on perceptions of the political costs and benefits of
carrying it out. The politicization of the death penalty makes its use
far more mercurial than other, less controversial punishments, and
hence its application less certain. This too detracts from its deterrent
force.
Death-in-prison, by contrast, would not suffer these defects. Far
more defendants could be sentenced to death-in-prison. Indeed, most
of the large number of capital defendants who currently receive
LWOP could be sentenced to death-in-prison with no impact on the
current allocation of prison resources. This would ensure that all
persons who commit capital murder could be sentenced comparably.
By adopting death-in-prison as a jurisdiction’s highest penalty, the
arbitrary selection of a small handful of unlucky defendants for
execution would come to an end. Rather than sentence a few
defendants to death and most others to LWOP, both groups of
defendants could be sentenced to death-in-prison upon an adequate
showing of desert. Exercise of the state’s highest penalty would then
look less like a lottery and more like a predictable, and fairly
distributed, penal sanction. This would not only improve the
proportionality of punishment, it would enhance deterrence by
clearly communicating to the entire class of would-be offenders that
the state’s ultimate punishment will be imposed with certainty.
B. Delay
Not only is the current death penalty used infrequently, when it is
imposed, the delay between sentence and execution is extraordinary.
These long delays tend to further undermine the efficacy of the death
penalty. Because of these delays, and because so many death row
prisoners succeed in getting death sentences reversed, the perception
among the general public—rightly or wrongly—is that justice in
death penalty cases is as often derailed as done.30 To make matters
30. See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Error
Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2000) (describing belief among death
penalty supporters that “death sentences move too slowly from imposition to execution, undermining
deterrence and retribution”).
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worse, the long delays between crime and punishment lead to a
strangely convoluted discourse when the moment to administer
punishment finally arrives because, as a result of the passage of time,
the recipient of a death sentence often is in a morally salient way a
very different person than the one who committed the crime.
1. The Causes of Delayed and Derailed Executions
There is one thing about which supporters and opponents of the
death penalty can agree: the modern death penalty is marked by
extremely long periods of delay between the imposition of a death
sentence and its execution. On average, more than eleven years
elapse between the imposition of sentence and its execution. In
California, the average delay exceeds seventeen years, and it is not
uncommon for delays of twenty years or more between sentence and
execution.31
These delays are in part a product of the death penalty’s procedural
complexity. In an effort to preserve the death penalty from
constitutional challenges, and to ensure that condemned prisoners
have a full and fair opportunity to contest the procedural integrity of
their convictions and sentences, litigation in capital cases is more
complex, lengthier, and more resource-intensive than in any other
area of the law. This complexity is necessary. When human life is at
stake, courts rightly demand a degree of heightened due process not
accorded defendants in non-capital cases. The special demands that
arise in death penalty cases have caused the Supreme Court to
develop a capital jurisprudence grounded on two governing
principles. First, because death sentences are only rarely imposed,
jurisdictions seeking to impose the penalty in individual cases must
provide jurors with “guided discretion” that ensures a rational and
non-arbitrary method of identifying the few death-worthy cases from
the many non-death-worthy cases. At the same time, the Court has
31. See Judge Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 697, 700 (2007) (reporting statistics and noting that delay is much longer in some cases); id. at 707
n.49 (reporting that, according to statistics kept by the California Department of Corrections as of 2005,
119 persons had been on death row for more than twenty years).
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held, every capital defendant is entitled to the jury’s individual
consideration of whatever mitigating evidence exists. Because these
two principles—guided discretion and individual consideration—are
in fundamental tension,32 efforts to reconcile both principles have
greatly compounded the complexity of capital jurisprudence.
Complexity in capital cases, however, is not solely a function of
efforts to minimize error, ensure individual consideration of
mitigation evidence, or to reduce arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking by juries. Because of the highly political nature of capital
cases, states have lobbied for special rules that make it easier for
prosecutors to win death sentences. The rules regarding the deathqualification of jurors, for example, have been shown to
systematically skew juries to make them more prosecution-friendly.
Such juries are not only more likely to hand down death sentences,
they are also more likely to convict at the earlier guilt-innocence
stage of proceedings. As a result, even in cases where prosecutors do
not intend to pursue a death sentence, there is an incentive to charge a
capital offense in order to win a jury panel that is more likely to
convict.
The combination of heightened due process in some respects and
substandard due process in others has inevitably made capital trials
not only more complex, but also more prone to legal error, both by
lawyers and judges, than conventional criminal trials.33 This in turn
has heightened the need for well-trained and competent capital
lawyers to navigate the complexities of capital cases. While demand
for competent counsel in death penalty cases has increased, cashstarved states have become increasingly reluctant to devote more
than token resources to capital defense work. As a result, capital
cases boast a disproportionate number of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.34 The complexity of the cases and the high risk of
32. See William W. Berry, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011) (noting that
“requiring states to use a general set of parameters to create consistent jury verdicts in capital cases in
conjunction with the requirement that juries consider all relevant individual and case-specific
characteristics creates some internal tension, if not outright conflict”).
33. Liebman et al., supra note 30, at 1844 (finding that capital sentences “are persistently and
systematically fraught with alarming amounts of error”).
34. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth
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error make an extended post-conviction review process necessary,
while the high stakes ensure that all post-conviction remedies are
fully utilized. Capital convictions routinely make at least three trips
up the appellate ladder: once on state direct appeal, once on state
collateral review, and once on federal habeas review. On each trip,
the United States Supreme Court has the discretion, but not the
obligation, to hear the case. It is not unusual for capital cases to
consume even more judicial resources than this.
2. Delay and Retribution
This systemic delay robs the death penalty of much of its ability to
serve as an effective retributive institution. To many, justice delayed
is justice denied. After delays of one or more decades, a community
may long have forgotten the details or the emotional excitement that
accompanied the crime. The prosecutors, judges, and jurors who
participated in the capital trial may well have moved away, retired or
died. The community may have changed, or they may have tired of
the matter. For example, while most of the world was transfixed by
the events leading up to the execution in 2011 of Troy Davis, who
had been convicted and sentenced to death in 1991 for the murder of
a Savannah police officer, some Savannah residents stated their
preference to “move on” and claimed to pay little attention to the
controversy.35 “It’s fresh around the world, but it’s old news to us,”
one resident stated, adding that “[a]bout half [of local residents] are
interested and the other half are over it and just want to turn on the
game.”36
Given the routine delays between sentence and execution, many
retributive justifications for the death penalty appear spurious. One
such justification is based in an acknowledgement of a proper place
for vengeance in criminal punishment. In affirming the constitutional
validity of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
Circuit Capital Cases, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2006) (observing that “[i]neffective assistance
of counsel claims are extremely common in capital habeas corpus cases”).
35. Katie Leslie, Savannahians Divided on Davis Case, But Seek Closure, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Sept. 20, 2011, 5:45 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/savannahians-divided-on-davis-1185170.html.
36. Id.
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reasoned that retention of the death penalty was a necessary
concession to man’s baser instincts.
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a free society governed by law. When people
begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they “deserve,” then there are sown the seeds of anarchy of
self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.37
The notion that the state’s choice is between mob lynching and
state execution may have had some historical basis, at least in certain
parts of the American South.38 But given the routinely long delays
between sentence and execution that are characteristic of the modern
death penalty, it is hard to take this idea seriously today. Certainly, it
is hard to see how the uncertain prospect of an execution ten or more
years in the future would satisfy the supposed bloodlust of a vigilante
mob so impatient for justice that it cannot even wait for a
conventional trial and appeals process to conclude. The claim that
capital punishment is necessary to quell the impulse of the mob,
moreover, is further diminished by the experience of the fourteen
states that have abolished the death penalty without any apparent
epidemic of vigilante justice. There is no reason to believe that
sentences of death-in-prison would provide insufficient retribution or
fail to neutralize the community’s thirst for vengeance and prevent a
return to the bad old days of lynching.
Another frequent and powerful retributive justification for capital
punishment has emerged from the victims’ rights movement.
According to some, the chief benefit of capital punishment is the

37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–84 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
38. For a discussion of the relationship between lynching and capital punishment in the South, see
Garland, supra note 8, at 32–38.
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sense of “closure” it brings to the victim’s loved ones.39 But here,
too, the purported benefits of the death penalty are defeated by the
long delay between crime and execution. Far from providing closure,
a death sentence often portends years of uncertainty for victims’
families, who wait throughout the long appellate and collateral
review process for the ultimate punishment to be inflicted. Family
members may suffer extreme anxiety and emotional upheaval when
executions are scheduled and then stayed by courts, sometimes
repeatedly, over many years.40 Family members are often compelled
to testify in subsequent court proceedings and before clemency
boards who review applications for relief by the condemned prisoner.
They are interviewed by the media, and are asked again and again to
relive what is likely the worst experience of their lives.41 This
experience must feel nothing like justice to anyone who lives through
it, but rather a kind of mindless bureaucratic torture.42 Finally, when
executions do occur, family members usually express, more than
anything else, a sense of numb relief that the long ordeal is over.
Indeed, this relief is often followed by bouts of depression brought
about by the realization that the execution of the perpetrator will not
bring back a loved one or change the circumstances of that family
member’s life.43
39. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1599 (2000) (describing hope among families of murder
victims).
40. See Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 853 (2009) (noting that “capital trials and the
long delays between capital sentencing and execution may actually prevent their wounds from healing”).
41. See N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 14, at 33 (“Survivors testified to the pain
of being forced to relive the trauma of their loved ones’ murders during prolonged appeals.”); Peter
Loge, The Process of Healing and the Trial as Product: Incompatibility, Courts, and Murder Victim
Family Members, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH
PENALTY 411, 413 (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006) (observing that “[f]amilies must
endure proceedings over years and through a series of iterations, forcing them to keep reliving the
crime” ensuring that “[r]egardless of outcome . . . the family is always punished”).
42. See Bandes, supra note 39, at 1601 (reporting “experience of the long wait for execution” by one
mother of murder victim as a self-described “kind of torture, another barrier to closure”); Margaret
Vandiver, The Death Penalty and the Families of Victims: An Overview of Research Issues, in WOUNDS
THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 41, at 235, 239
(discussing research indicating “that ‘repetitive confrontations with the criminal justice system can
disrupt the recovery of victims’ families’”).
43. See Judith W. Kay, Is Restitution Possible for Murder?—Surviving Family Members Speak, in
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Death-in-prison promises to deliver more closure to grieving
family members than the dysfunctional death penalty ritual. Because
punishment is imposed immediately upon sentence, whatever
“closure” the community obtains from punishment will be
experienced at the moment of sentencing, not years later. Family
members of victims need not spend years waiting to see if the penalty
will finally be carried out, nor feeling cheated of justice when the
execution—for whatever reason—does not occur. Indeed, many
family members currently consent, when consulted by prosecutors, to
a plea bargain rather than demand a death penalty trial for the
perpetrator precisely because they believe that such a path offers a
quicker route to “closure.”44 By consolidating trial, sentence, and the
imposition of sentence, healing might commence sooner and
communities might heal faster than they do in jurisdictions where
executions are carried out years, and often decades, after the crime.
Although death-in-prison sentences arguably would look
functionally similar to LWOP sentences, the moral import of a deathin-prison sentence would differ from a “life” sentence, or even an
LWOP sentence, in at least two ways.
A death-in-prison sentence would be unlike a conventional death
sentence in that it would not entail the possibility of affirmative state
conduct that brings about the death of the prisoner. Such a sentence
would nonetheless represent powerful expressive condemnation of
criminal misconduct. Symbolically, a death-in-prison sentence is
superior to a life without parole sentence and should resonate with
retributive supporters of the death penalty because it emphasizes the
ultimate nature of the penalty: total and permanent loss of civil life.
WOUNDS THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 323, 337 (James
R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006) (noting that although majority of public appears to believe that
capital punishment provides “closure” to family members of victims, “for survivors, healing, like
closure, is a word abhorred, implying as it does ‘getting over it’”). A similar sentiment was expressed by
Leah Popp in a joint hearing of the New Mexico House and Senate Judiciary Committees, who told the
committees that “there is [no such] thing” as closure, and that if her niece’s killer was ultimately
executed, “his death will not ease our pain nor will it honor our son.” Loge, supra note 41, at 412 n.5.
44. See, e.g., Robert L. Gottsfield, Douglas L. Rayes & Patricia Starr, A Court’s Remarkable
Recovery from a Capital Case Crisis, 48 ARIZ. ATT’Y 18, 24 n.18 (2011) (finding that in Arizona
“[o]ften the victims advise they would rather have an attempt at closure sooner with a plea rather than
wait out the average 20 years between conviction and the execution of the sentence”).
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By emphasizing that the sentence is one of “death” rather than “life,”
the sentence would highlight the terminal nature of the punishment.
Where juries must decide between conventional death sentences
and life without parole, the juries’ decision to sentence the convict to
life without parole may appear to be an act of mercy. Defendants
who receive such sentences are popularly perceived to have been
spared, the hand of the state stayed. And yet, punishment for the vast
majority of LWOP prisoners is virtually identical to those sentenced
to death. Both types of prisoners will spend decades in jail. Most will
die in prison of natural causes. Barring pardon or exoneration, neither
type of prisoner will ever rejoin civil society. Death-in-prison
sentences would acknowledge the essential sameness of treatment
endured by both groups of defendants in a way that current
conventional death penalty sentencing proceedings obscure. Whereas
a LWOP sentence emphasizes “life” for the condemned prisoner,
death-in-prison emphasizes the condemned prisoner’s ultimate
termination, making it far harder to interpret the sentence as an act of
leniency or mercy.
In addition, while LWOP often functions as an alternative sentence
to death, death-in-prison would represent the highest penalty
available to a state. Because death-in-prison would be the severest
punishment authorized by law, family members of victims would not
feel that a comparative penal wrong had been done or that the victim
in the case was being valued less than other victims whose killers
were sentenced to die by execution.45

45. See Bandes, supra note 39, at 1605 (observing that “prosecutors explicitly call upon juries to
return death sentences in order to affirm the victims’ worth”); Vandiver, supra note 42, at 242 (“Any
sentence lighter than the maximum provided by law runs the risk of seeming to indicate that the criminal
justice system, or society in general, did not properly value the victim’s life or comprehend the
magnitude of the family’s loss.”). Other features of the current death penalty could also be incorporated,
such as continuing to house persons condemned to death-in-prison in segregated facilities, or “death
rows,” and preventing from mixing with prisoners serving finite prison terms. However, research
literature suggests that the current practice of segregating death-row prisoners is inordinately costly,
harmful to prisoners and correctional facility staff, and unnecessary in terms of facility security.
Accordingly, I do not recommend retention of segregated death rows unless doing so is the only
politically feasible way to win support of the proposal.
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3. Delay and deterrence
It is well established that punishment is most effective when
sanctions quickly follow misdeeds. Long delay between them mutes
the message intended by the punishment regime, both for the
recipient of the sanction and for the community.46 Even if we assume
the death penalty has some deterrent value, the deterrent function is
undermined by the long delays between crime and execution
characteristic of the death penalty.47 Few criminals motivated by
rational calculations of expected punishment likely refrain from
committing crimes in fear of a death penalty that is only rarely
imposed and then only after a decades-long delay.48
Death-in-prison sentences would be penologically superior to
conventional death sentences because, in a literal sense, the
punishment would be imposed immediately upon sentencing. When a
convicted offender is sentenced and removed from the courtroom
with knowledge that he or she will never be released from prison, the
punishment is already being meted out. Of course, the same fate
(immediate imprisonment) awaits the recipient of a conventional
death sentence, but the meaning imposed on events is quite different.
The condemned prisoner is sent to death row to await imposition of
punishment. Death row is figured as a holding area, not the place of
punishment itself.
One of the most frequently advanced arguments by death penalty
advocates is that at least for one class of persons—those already
sentenced to life-in-prison—the death penalty is essential to provide
some marginal deterrent.49 On closer inspection, however, this
argument too appears specious. First, for reasons already discussed,
46. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (1989) (“[D]elay
undermines the deterrent effect of capital punishment and reduces public confidence in the criminal
justice system.”).
47. See Alarcón, supra note 31, at 709 (“[L]ong delays diminish the deterrent value of the death
penalty.”).
48. See Katz et al., supra note 25, at 319 (noting long lag between crime and execution and stating
that “[g]iven the high discount rates of many criminals and the fact that many homicides are committed
by individuals under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which further foreshorten time horizons, it is hard
to believe that punishment with such a long delay would be effective”) (internal citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., Ernest Van Den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Practical and Moral
Analysis, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 323, 327 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
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the long delays and arbitrary imposition that characterize the death
penalty likely undercut the penalty’s deterrent function for this group
as well. Second, there is no evidence that homicide rates among lifesentenced prisoners are any greater in states with no death penalty
than in states with a death penalty.50 The likely reason is that
correctional authorities possess far more effective administrative
sanctions than the threat of capital punishment to deter prison
violence. For example, corrections officers may use detention in
solitary confinement cells and loss of institutional privileges. Indeed,
studies show that prisoners serving life sentences are far less violent
as a class than those serving definite terms.51
C. Uncertainty
Two main types of uncertainty tend to detract from the death
penalty’s effectiveness. The first concerns the accuracy of the
criminal justice process, as mounting evidence demonstrates that
innocent persons have been and continue to be sentenced to death.
The second concerns the moral uncertainty of the citizenry about the
penalty itself. Unlike with any other punishment, affirmative state
killing engenders heated disagreement about its moral legitimacy.
Inevitably, these debates fuse universal concerns with the particular
claims for justice in individual cases, and result in clouded and
ambiguous resolutions. To make matters worse, the long delays
between crime and punishment lead to a strangely convoluted
discourse when the moment to administer punishment finally arrives
because, as a result of the passage of time, the recipient of a death
sentence often is in a morally salient way a very different person than
the one who committed the crime.

50. See, e.g., Wendy Phillips Wolfson, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty upon Prison
Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 159, 167 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
51. See Andrea Lyon, “Reason Not the Need”: Does the Lack of Compelling State Interest in
Maintaining a Separate Death Row Make it Unlawful?, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 (2005) (reviewing
research study of Missouri prison system showing that after integration into mainstream facility with
other prisoners, “death-sentenced inmates had rates of institutional misconduct that were equivalent to
inmates sentenced to life-without parole” and far lower than parole-eligible inmates).
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1. Innocence and the death penalty
With a flurry of highly publicized exonerations, many from death
row, and in some instances coming within minutes of execution, the
American public has been sensitized to the risk of wrongful
executions. Such awareness has injected a dose of healthy caution
into the capital punishment system, likely inducing prosecutors and
judges, as well as jurors, to hesitate before seeking or imposing
capital punishment. Cautionary impulses, however, do not always
win out, and potentially innocent defendants continue to be sentenced
to death or to have their death sentences carried out notwithstanding
doubts about their culpability.52 Advocates for the abolition of the
death penalty have used such cases in an attempt to rally support,
with some success, for their position.
Since 1973, 140 prisoners have been released from death row
based on evidence that they were innocent.53 Seventeen of those
prisoners have been exonerated as a result of post-conviction DNA
testing alone.54 Professor Liebman and his co-authors have estimated
that more than two-thirds of all capital sentences are ultimately
reversed on appeal.55 Despite the frequent reversals, there is good
reason to believe that mistaken executions occur. Strong evidence
suggests that at least one innocent person has in recent years been
executed.56 Indeed, even in cases where the evidence of guilt is
known to be both weak and faulty, states have proceeded with
executions.57 Given the evidentiary weaknesses apparent in these
52. For example, the death sentence of Troy Davis was carried out despite public outcry over his
possible innocence, and Reggie Clemons remains on death row in spite of similar concerns.
53. Innocence
and
the
Death
Penalty,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
54. See
Facts
on
Post-Conviction
DNA
Exonerations,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php
(last
visited Dec. 5, 2011).
55. Liebman et. al., supra note 30, at 1847.
56. See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas execute an innocent man?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept.
7, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann; see also
Paul C. Giannelli, The Execution of Cameron Todd Willingham: Junk Science, An Innocent Man, and
the Politics of Death, (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917454.
57. For example, in the Troy Davis case, seven witnesses recanted their trial testimony in some way.
The testimony of one of those witnesses—a jailhouse “snitch”—was specifically found by the habeas
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cases, it is almost certain that innocent defendants continue to be put
to death.
Mistakes are inevitable in any humanly designed system, and so
they are inevitable in a system of capital punishment too. Given our
certain knowledge that mistakes on occasion will occur, the practice
of executing death row prisoners who we may later learn are innocent
is deeply problematic. The morally imperative goal of preventing
wrongful executions thus provides a powerful argument for ending
capital punishment. Unlike death, imprisonment is always at least
theoretically subject to review and termination. While it is true, as
some death penalty advocates argue, that all time served by someone
who has been falsely convicted of a crime is irrevocably lost, it is
simply not true that error-correction for all wrongfully-convicted
persons is impossible. New evidence may surface days, or decades,
after the jury renders its verdict. As long as a prisoner remains alive,
it is possible to alter or amend a sentence. Although it may be
impossible to fully compensate an exonerated prisoner for the time
lost in prison, partial compensation is possible. In addition, a wrongly
convicted prisoner can at least experience the satisfaction of
vindication, can receive a formal apology, and can know that his or
her name has been cleared. A person who has been executed cannot
experience any of these things. A strong argument therefore exists
that, even in cases where we are reasonably confident that death is
the deserved sentence, taking affirmative action to bring about the
death of the prisoner—and thereby permanently foreclosing any
possibility of error-correction upon newly discovered evidence—
unnecessarily truncates the post-conviction review process and
therefore always falls below the minimum post-conviction process
that is due.58 Death-in-prison, which keeps alive the possibility that

court to have been perjury, yet neither the courts nor the pardons board were willing to halt Davis’
execution. Kim Severson, Georgia Pardons Board Denies Clemency for Death Row Inmate, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/us/troy-davis-is-denied-clemency-ingeorgia.html.
58. See Bandes, supra note 39, at 1606 (arguing that death penalty “forecloses, too early, the societal
obligation not to put an accused to death until he has a fair chance to show himself unworthy of the
conviction and sentence”).
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detected errors are corrected, is more consistent with the system’s
proven fallibility and the needs of due process.
Not only does the conventional death penalty inherently risk
wrongful execution, but the presence of some evidence that particular
prisoners may in fact be innocent injects an untenable degree of
moral ambiguity into the act of executing capital defendants. This
ambiguity seriously detracts from the contemporary death penalty’s
ability to deliver supposed penological benefits.
Consider again the Troy Davis case. In the fall of 2011, Georgia
executed Troy Davis notwithstanding substantial evidence that Davis
was innocent of the murder for which he had been sentenced to
death. That evidence included recantations by seven of the nine
witnesses who testified against him at trial, new ballistics evidence,
and testimony by several individuals that another individual had
confessed to the crime. Davis’s last act before execution was to
profess his innocence.59 Thousands of spectators, protesting the
execution outside the jail and, literally, around the world, believe it.60
Whether or not Davis was, in fact, innocent, his execution under
these circumstances was deeply problematic and advanced few
coherent penological goals.61 As writer Scott Turow observed,
Davis’s execution likely will “leave only a lingering sense of
injustice,” making it “hard to argue it made the clear moral statement
the death penalty supposedly represents.”62 Where an execution is
carried out in the face of an insistence on innocence, the convicted
prisoner exhibits neither contrition nor remorse. Where that
insistence is supported by at least some credible evidence of
innocence, the execution will likely make the general public more,
59. See Hannah Roberts & Mark Duell, The 23 Words that Sentenced Troy Davis to Death: U.S.
Supreme Court Order Revealed as Clinton and Carter Weigh in on Debate, MAIL ONLINE (Sep. 22,
2011),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2040054/Death-penalty-debate-US-Supreme-Courtorder-confirmed-Troy-Davis-execution.html.
60. See Troy Davis Execution Sparks Anti-death Penalty Backlash, Protests, WASH. POST (Sep. 23,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/troy-davis-execution-sparks-anti-death-penaltybacklash-protests/2011/09/22/gIQAQawOoK_story.html.
61. As President Jimmy Carter observed, “[i]f one of our fellow citizens can be executed with so
much doubt surrounding his guilt, then the death penalty system in our country is unjust and outdated.”
Troy Davis Execution Sparks Anti-death Penalty Backlash, Protests, supra note 60.
62. Turow, supra note 3.
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not less, cynical about the efficacy and justice of the criminal law.
Such executions might even undermine deterrence by deepening the
perception among wrongdoers that they might commit crimes and
escape justice by fooling the courts into convicting the wrong person.
Plausible death chamber professions of innocence, moreover, are
not uncommon. Johnny Frank Garrett angrily professed his
innocence before Texas officials put him to death. Many believe
Garrett was innocent.63 Another condemned Texas prisoner,
Cameron Todd Willingham, was also asked if he wished to make a
statement before death, and also proclaimed his innocence.
Willingham is now widely viewed as probably having been executed
for a crime he did not commit.64 Yet another Texas prisoner, Steven
Woods, professed his innocence and characterized his forthcoming
execution as a “murder” rather than an “execution.”65 Leonel Herrera,
defendant in one of the Supreme Court’s landmark actual innocence
cases, similarly died professing his innocence.66 Of course, not all
professions of innocence are true. Roger Coleman proclaimed his
innocence to the end, but post-execution DNA testing confirmed
Coleman’s guilt. We thus know that some condemned prisoners are
lying about their innocence, but we rarely can tell which ones are and
which are not, thus infusing the practice of executing prisoners with
an inescapable aura of ambiguity. By contrast, in a death-in-prison
regime, innocence-based appeals can be considered as part of the
regular course of post-conviction review. Even where inadequate
evidence exists to overturn a conviction, the possibility that new
evidence might demand that result will remain.
63. THE LAST WORD (Cinco Rosas Productions 2008).
64. When asked if he wished to make a statement, Willingham reportedly answered,
[t]he only statement I want to make is that I am an innocent man convicted of a crime I
did not commit. I have been persecuted for 12 years for something I did not do. From
God’s dust I came and to dust I will return, so the earth shall become my throne.
David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann?printable=true#ixzz1VCY7rTz
R.
65. See Last Words, STEVEN WOODS: WRONGFULLY EXECUTED BY THE STATE OF TEXAS,
http://www.stevenmichaelwoods.info/StevenWoodsLastWords.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
66. See STUDS TERKEL, WILL THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN?: REFLECTIONS ON DEATH, REBIRTH, AND
HUNGER FOR A FAITH (New Press 2001). Herrera’s proclamations of innocence were implausible, given
the strong evidence of his guilt, including a written confession found in his pocket.
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Not all possibly innocent condemned prisoners are put to death
while proclaiming innocence. Some, in fact, succeed in winning
commutations of their sentences. That was the case for Henry Lee
Lucas. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, Lucas
confessed to the murder of an unnamed hitchhiker in Texas in 1979,
and was sentenced to death in 1984. Lucas, however, “also confessed
to hundreds of other murders including the murder of Jimmy Hoffa
and his fourth grade teacher, who is still alive. Most of his
confessions have proved false.”67 State investigators concluded that
Lucas almost certainly did not commit the murder for which he had
been convicted. Lucas’s death sentence was therefore commuted to
life-in-prison in June 1998. Lucas died in prison in 2001. Winning
commutation of a death sentence because of doubts about guilt is an
unusual event, but when it occurs, such a commutation is something
of a hollow victory. Commutation of a death sentence to life without
parole still means the prisoner never returns to society. It is still a
death sentence, just one that is drawn out over a longer process. For
Lucas, it won him an extra three years. What is worse, such prisoners
likely lose whatever legal leverage they had when an execution was
looming. While pro bono counsel for death-sentenced prisoners is
fairly common, far more life-serving prisoners go unrepresented.
While the perception among the public that a decision to commute a
death sentence to life without parole is an act of mercy, from the
innocent prisoner’s point of view the commutation is at best a mixed
blessing, perhaps better than the alternative but still wholly
inadequate to rectify the wrong that has been done. In a death-inprison regime, prisoners who convinced decision makers to commute
their sentences based on innocence would presumably be entitled to
release rather than continued incarceration, which seems a far fairer
outcome where the prisoner has succeeded in demonstrating that he is
more likely than not innocent.

67. Additional
Innocence
Information,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/additional-innocence-information#R-Poss (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
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2. Offender-focused proceedings
A second type of uncertainty—society’s own moral uncertainty
about the propriety of the death penalty—provides an additional
source of death penalty dysfunction. This uncertainty is often
manifested in the periodic public stirs caused by an impending
controversial execution. When the state gears up to put one of its
citizens to death, many persons sympathize with the condemned, not
because they value the life of the perpetrator over his victim, but
because the act of execution requires independent justification. The
public debate, like the legal debate, then necessarily places the
condemned prisoner on center stage, allowing the perpetrator to be
portrayed as a victim in his or her own right. This leads to one of the
most frequently complained-about features of the modern American
death penalty: that executions are heavily focused, by necessity, on
the person who has been condemned to die. As victims’ rights
advocates so often complain, the crime victim seems to get lost in the
shuffle.68 The focus on the condemned prisoner is compounded by
the groundswell of sympathy that sometimes occurs as well. Under
these conditions, the moral message of an execution can easily
become clouded, as retributive sentiments intermix with concerns
about racial and socioeconomic equity, due process, and community
responsibility.
This dynamic is further complicated by the dramatic changes in the
prisoner’s circumstances or character that sometimes occur during
the long period between conviction and execution. The individual
who is walked or wheeled to the execution chamber is often in some
real sense a different person than the one who committed the crime.
Over the years, drug addictions are overcome, mental illnesses are
treated or acquired, identities shift. Individuals repent for their
misdeeds, they age, they get sick.69 They find a purpose, or lose all
68. See Loge, supra note 41, at 412 (noting that death penalty supporters “grow frustrated with what
they see as undue focus on process, viewing it as ‘offender focused’”).
69. Clarence Ray Allen, for example, was convicted and sentenced to die for killing three people on
September 5, 1980. When he was executed more than twenty-five years later, he was “seventy-six years
old and suffering from blindness, hearing loss, advanced diabetes, heart disease, complications from a
stroke, and complications from a heart attack that left him in a wheelchair.” Alarcón, supra note 31, at
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hope. Sometimes rehabilitation occurs. The criminal may have been a
drug-crazed hoodlum whose crimes were committed in the madness
of a methamphetamine high, while the condemned prisoner on the
gurney is a sober, civic-minded, G.E.D.-carrying, middle-aged
prisoner who writes books or poetry and advocates against drug
use.70
Take the case of Stanley “Tookie” Williams. Williams was a
founding member of the “Crips” street gang in Los Angeles, a gang
responsible for countless killings, violent crimes, and drug activity.
In 1979, Williams was convicted of two brutal robbery-murders,
involving point-blank, execution-style shootings of multiple victims.
Although Williams steadfastly asserted his innocence in these cases,
the evidence suggests that Williams was a heavy-user of drugs at the
time, and the jury likely convicted Williams convinced that Williams
had committed the murders in a drug-induced vicious crime spree.
The jury sentenced Williams to death.71
In subsequent years, however, while Williams’ appeal was
working its way through the system, Williams underwent a striking
transformation. As a result of prison, Williams recovered from drug
addiction. He wrote a series of children’s books encouraging kids to
stay away from gang life. He was asked to intervene in an ongoing
gang war, and helped to broker a truce among the gangs. As a result
of these activities, he was nominated for a Nobel prize.72
Ultimately, after failing to win a reprieve in the courts, Williams
asked California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger for clemency. A
high-profile debate ensued. As a result, Californians were forced to
confront the reality that the person slated to die by lethal injection
was not, in a quite visible sense, the same person who had been
704.
70. Cf. DAVID ROSE, THE BIG EDDY CLUB: THE STOCKING STRANGLINGS AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE
39 (2007) (discussing case of William Anthony Brooks, whose execution was stayed by the Eleventh
Circuit eighteen hours before his scheduled death, and who earned a high school diploma and began
studies for a university degree after being removed from death row).
71. See Evan J. Mandery, Mercy and Contrition, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 4 (2006) (setting forth facts of
Williams’ convictions).
72. See Alex Alonso, Stanley Tookie Williams, Could be First Gang Member Executed in California,
STREETGANGS.COM (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.streetgangs.com/features/102605_tookie.
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sentenced to die many years before. The debate forced consideration
of the possibility that even capital murderers might be rehabilitated,
and focused the state’s attention on the moral utility of executing an
individual who managed to make meaningful contributions to society
from his death-row prison cell. Ultimately, Governor
Schwarzenegger declined Williams’ petition and Williams was
executed, but not without leaving many with a profound sense of the
vacuity of the death penalty system.
3. Mixed moral message of state-sponsored killing
Uncertainty about the moral propriety of the death penalty is
undergirded by deep disagreement about the moral legitimacy of
state-sponsored killing. Regardless of which side is “correct,” there
can be little doubt that a state-sponsored execution is, at the least, an
exercise fraught with moral tension. While supporters trumpet
executions as the ultimate vindication of victims’ rights and the
realization of the retributive “eye-for-an-eye” principle, others point
out the oddity, or even perversity, of teaching the wrongfulness of
killing by killing. This is not a new observation. Cesare Beccaria
long ago observed that it hardly makes sense “for the state to publicly
commit murder in order to condemn it.”73 Some perceive little moral
difference between the two acts. As one family member of a murder
victim testified in hearings on the death penalty, capital punishment
“is a horrible thing which almost matches the horror of what some of
us have lost by murder.”74
Not only is the moral message inherent in state-sponsored
executions potentially ambiguous, executions might do more to
promote public violence than to quell it. Beccaria viewed public
executions in this way, arguing that rather than teach the public the
wrongness of killing, public executions provide an “‘example of
barbarity’ that its witnesses would be more prone to emulate than to
73. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms
an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 127 (2010) (quoting Cesare Beccaria, OF CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS (1764), available at http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun28.htm).
74. N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 14, at 39.
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avoid.”75 Beccaria’s contention appears to have been widely accepted
in the modern era, evidenced by the universal shift of executions
from the public square to the private execution chamber.76 The ban
on public executions evinces a recognition that state-sponsored
executions have the potential to send mixed messages to the public,
and displays an inherent ambivalence about the perceived moral
propriety of state-sponsored killing.
Death-in-prison sentences avoid this inevitable paradox. By
simultaneously imposing punishment that strips its recipient of his
freedom for the remainder of his natural life, but in such a way as to
reinforce the underlying message that killing is wrongful, death-inprison represents a far superior, and far less problematic, penal
response to murder.
4. Cost Savings
Needless to say, replacing the conventional death penalty with
death-in-prison would save substantial public resources. These
economic savings are tempting to all policymakers, even those in
traditionally conservative states. As Carol and Jordan Steiker have
observed, the economic argument against the death penalty has
proven far more effective in garnering support for abolition, or at
least for its reduced use, than have arguments based on morality or
human rights.77 Even conservative law-and-order politicians now
recognize that exaggeratedly punitive and costly criminal justice
policies need to be reconsidered.
Even before the financial crisis began in 2008, years of tax cuts
and steadily increasing governmental costs placed major strains on
state budgets. These strains were particularly acute for criminal
justice programs, which have seen “years of underfunding.”78 As a
result, indigent defense programs have been squeezed beyond the

75. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 73, at 127.
76. See Garland, supra note 8, at 106–10.
77. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous Debate,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 670 (2010).
78. THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION 2 (2009).
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breaking point, public defender positions have been slashed
nationwide, and caseloads have continued to increase.79
The effects of the budgetary squeeze have been particularly
pronounced with respect to capital defense, in some places causing
an almost total breakdown. In California, for example, the delay in
assignments of lawyers to assist with mandatory post-conviction
appeals now approaches five years, and the delay for appointment of
counsel to assist in the habeas process averages an additional three
years.80 At the same time, the high cost of funding capital defense has
greatly compounded the budgetary pressures on states’ indigent
defender systems. In Georgia, a single death penalty case in 2008
virtually bankrupted the entire state indigent defense budget,81 and
indigent funding has yet to recover.82 Smaller and less wealthy
counties in many states no longer pursue death penalty cases,
regardless of the comparative desert of offenders, because their
smaller budgets would be decimated by the cost of a capital

79. Id. “As state revenues fall and public defender budgets are slashed, more and more indigent
defense delivery systems are reporting crippling caseloads.” Id.; see also Darryl K. Brown,
Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 908 (2010) (“[I]ndigent defense is perennially
underfunded in many jurisdictions.”).
80. See Judge Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-billion Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 41, 47 (2011); see also Sara Colón, Comment, Capital Crime: How California’s
Administration of the Death Penalty Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2009)
(citing CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 23-24 (2008)).
81. The defense of Brian Nichols, who was convicted of killing four people in a brutal courthouse
shooting and against whom prosecutors sought a death sentence, cost at least $3.2 million. See Bill
Rankin, Can Georgia Afford the Death Penalty?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 11, 2009, at Al; Steve
Visser & Rhonda Cook, Nichols’ Defense Costs $3.2 Million, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 22, 2009, at B1.
By comparison, the state of Georgia allocated $4 million for its entire indigent defense budget. See
Dennis Brandon Wood, Driving Up the Costs: An Examination of the Brian Nichols Trial and the New
Attack on the Death Penalty, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 173, 178 (2008). Writing for the New Yorker, Jeffrey
Toobin noted that as a result of the Nichols case, “the state agency responsible for indigent defense
ha[d] run out of money.” Jeffrey Toobin, Death in Georgia, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/04/080204fa_fact_toobin?currentPage=all.
82. See Steve Visser, High Court Warns “Clock is Ticking” in Gwinnett Death Penalty Case,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 27, 2012, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/gwinnett/high-court-warnsclock-1364619.html (discussing decision by Georgia Supreme Court not to throw out capital murder
charges where a defendant “has not been brought to trial in nearly seven years, due in part to delays
caused by the state’s financially strained indigent defense system”).
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prosecution. The high cost of capital prosecutions has caused a
decrease in death sentences in larger and wealthier counties as well.83
While there is no reliable evidence that the conventional death
penalty serves as a deterrent,84 there is ample evidence that the costs
of maintaining a functioning capital punishment system are
bankrupting the public fisc. Although it is difficult to precisely
calculate the comparative costs of the death penalty as to alternative
punishments, there appears to be a broad consensus that the costs of
death sentences are substantially higher than the costs of life without
parole (LWOP).85 Researchers have found that filing a death notice
alone in a death penalty case in Maryland is associated with an
additional $1 million in costs.86 Studies conducted in North Carolina
in 1993 and in Kansas in 1994 found an annual additional expense
for death penalty cases of some $4 million each compared to noncapital punishment cases.87 Additional expenses arise from the
maintenance of special facilities to house those condemned to death.
In California, recent studies have estimated that “death-row
incarceration costs the state an additional $90,000 per inmate, per
year (above the cost of non-capital incarceration), or $60 million a
year overall.”88
These costs add up. California has spent an estimated $4 billion on
capital punishment since reinstating the death penalty in 1978, over
which time it has executed only thirteen individuals, translating into a

83. See Adam Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role
in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010) (noting that because death penalty cases are
extremely expensive and complicated, counties with large budgets and experienced prosecutors are able
to seek the death penalty often, while smaller counties with limited budgets frequently lack the funds
and institutional knowledge to seek the death penalty in even the most heinous cases, resulting in
geographic arbitrariness within a state).
84. See supra Part II.B.3.
85. See, e.g., N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 14, at 31 (concluding that
“[t]he costs of the death penalty are greater than the costs of life in prison without parole, but it is not
possible to measure these costs with any degree of precision”).
86. John K. Roman, Aaron J. Chalfin & Carly R. Knight, Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty
Using Quasi-Experimental Methods: Evidence from Maryland, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 530, 530
(2009).
87. MARTHA CARTER, L.R.D. REP. NO. 95-2, COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE ISSUE (1995).
88. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 77, at 670.
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per execution cost of more than $307 million dollars.89 Maryland,
which has executed five individuals in the post-Furman era, has
spent $37.2 million per execution during that period.90 The savings
expected from abolition of the death penalty in low-usage New
Jersey is calculated at $1.46 million annually.91 Higher usage states
like North Carolina, where abolition was projected to save the state
around $11 million per year, would likely save more.92 Some states,
such as California, potentially stand to save even more than that.
The potential cost savings from abolition of the conventional death
penalty are enormous. The main expense in capital cases comes from
the increased costs of trials, which are substantially more costly to
litigate than non-death-penalty cases.93 Death penalty trials consume
more resources for a variety of reasons, including that more and
better experienced lawyers are typically involved, on both the
prosecutorial and defense sides,94 more investigators and experts are
needed, especially at the penalty phase of a capital trial, and because
jury selection in a capital trial takes far longer to complete.95
Additional expenses are incurred as a result of the drawn-out
appellate review and subsequent state and federal habeas and other
post-conviction review processes.

89. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 80, at 41.
90. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 73, at 120.
91. N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 14, at 31. “The Office of the Public
Defender estimated that, given its current caseload of 19 death penalty cases (as of August 2006),
elimination of the death penalty would result in a cost savings of $1.46 million per year.” Id.
92. Phillip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, AM. L.
&
ECON.
REV.,
Dec.
11,
2009,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CookCostRpt.pdf (finding that “the state would have spent
almost $11 million less each year on criminal justice activities (including appeals and imprisonment) if
the death penalty had been abolished”).
93. See Randolph N. Jonakait & Larry Eger, The Fiscal Crisis as an Opportunity for Criminal
Justice Reform: Defenders Building Alliances with Fiscal Conservatives, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1159,
1186–87 (2012); Mark A. Larranaga, Washington’s Death Penalty System: A Review Of The Costs,
Length & Results Of Capital Cases In Washington State, WASH. DEATH PENALTY ASSISTANCE CENTER
14 (2004), available at http://www.abolishdeathpenalty.org/PDF/WAStateDeathPenaltyCosts.pdf
(finding costs of death penalty trials to range from 3 to 6 times more than non-death-penalty trials);
Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 80, at 71 (reporting that “[c]apital cases often cost 10 to 20 times more
than murder trials that don’t involve the death penalty”).
94. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 80, at 77.
95. Id.
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These expenses, which are necessary to ensure compliance with
the heightened due process requirements triggered by the death
penalty, can be quite large in some outlier cases, such as the Nichols
trial in Georgia, which by itself was projected to cost the state more
than $3 million.96 Some counties that opt to pursue capital
convictions find the costs of trying the cases both onerous and
controversial, as was true in the trial of Levi King, a Texas prisoner
already serving a life sentence. After a Texas prosecutor charged
King with capital murder, the rural county reportedly spent more than
$750,000 attempting to win a death sentence.97 Despite these costs,
the sentencing jury declined to impose a death sentence on King,
leaving the county budget in disarray.98
Death-in-prison would relieve states of the burden of devoting
extraordinary trial-related resources whenever the state seeks to
impose its highest penalty. Death is costlier when states seek to
affirmatively kill criminals. Death-in-prison sentences, which involve
penalties comparable to LWOP, should necessarily be imposed only
where defendants receive constitutionally adequate representation at
trial, but providing that representation should not consume the state’s
resources at anything like current death-penalty levels. These cost
savings independently justify abolition of the conventional death
penalty. Indeed, prospective cost savings were a major factor in the
success of the abolition argument in states like New Mexico.99
III. “DEATH IN PRISON” SENTENCES WOULD ADVANCE IMPORTANT
PENAL REFORMS
Not only would death-in-prison better achieve the retributive and
deterrent goals identified above and save money, it would open the

96. Visser & Cook, supra note 81.
97. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 73, at 121.
98. Id. (citing David Pittman, Murder Trial Costs Gray County a Lot, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J.,
Oct. 20, 2009, at A1).
99. See Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 80, at 208 (noting that cost savings was explicitly cited by
Governor Richardson when he signed legislation abolishing New Mexico’s death penalty).
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way for two important reforms: one specific to capital punishment,
and one to criminal punishment more generally.
A. Permanent vs. Temporary Exclusion: The Real Moral Choice
Structuring the penalty phase around the question of whether or
not to execute the defendant focuses the jury on an issue of
remarkably little practical salience. Whether a defendant should be
placed on death row for one or more decades and then, if his appeals
fail and he manages to survive those years in prison, be put to death,
or whether instead he should simply be consigned to prison to live
out the remaining number of years and then die has almost no bearing
on society in general. Either way, the prisoner is permanently
removed from civil society. From the community’s perspective, there
is little practical difference whether capital defendants are executed
or sentenced to LWOP. Both outcomes have the same ultimate effect:
to remove an individual, forever, from society. Viewed in this light,
capital penalty phase proceedings seem something of a sham. All of
the money and energy expended in them is directed to determining an
issue that makes almost no tangible difference to the life of the
community.100
Indeed, under current practices, the fixation on death versus
LWOP has led to a situation that borders on the absurd. The United
States Reports are packed with hundreds of Supreme Court decisions
on the death penalty establishing a constitutional capital
jurisprudence that is, in many ways, simply baroque. The Court’s
decisions have carved out a special, heightened standard of due
process for capital cases that has significantly increased the costs and
100. Of course, unlike executed prisoners, imprisoned defendants can, in theory, escape from prison.
The odds of escape are sufficiently remote, however, to make the threat almost entirely insubstantial.
Moreover, because condemned prisoners currently spend such long periods in prison awaiting
execution, the marginal risks posed by withholding executions are extremely minimal. Death-row
prisoners currently pose the same escape risks as LWOPers during the decade or more wait for
execution, and presumably both the risk of escape and the risk that the prisoner poses to society only
diminishes as the prisoner gets older. In addition, prisoners who pose heightened risks of escape can
always be housed in heightened security, supermax-type, facilities from which escape is virtually
impossible. For all these reasons, most commentators acknowledge that there is no significant difference
between lifetime imprisonment and a death sentence from an incapacitation standpoint.
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the difficulty of imposing capital punishment. But the irony is that all
this due process makes virtually no difference in practice, because as
noted above, for most capital convicts, the imposition of a death
sentence is functionally identical to the imposition of an LWOP
sentence. Regardless of sentence, the individual will most likely
spend the remainder of his or her natural life in prison and die a
natural death there.
In addition, when a jury is forced to choose between death and
LWOP, it has no opportunity to consider rehabilitation. As a project
of the prison system, rehabilitation makes little sense as long as the
rehabilitee will remain behind prison bars for life. Where jurors spare
a defendant in part because they believe the possibility of
rehabilitation is real, imposing a sentence that nonetheless precludes
reentry seems morally perverse. Prisoners without hope of reentry are
stripped of any incentive to comply with rehabilitation objectives.
Indeed, they are stripped of any hope at all. To the extent that such
prisoners nonetheless achieve some measure of rehabilitation, the
victory is largely a matter of mere private concern, since the
opportunities for permanently exiled prisoners to actively benefit
society are so meager.
The far more important question—from a societal standpoint, and I
think a moral one as well—is whether the convict should be
permanently banished from society with no hope of reentry or
whether there are some mitigating features of the case or defendant’s
personal background, history, and identity that leave room for hope
that the defendant might someday be returned to society. This is the
question that should be put to jurors and with which they should
grapple.
In short, current death penalty proceedings are largely a waste of
social resources because the morally important question is whether
the defendant should be permanently banished from society or
allowed, at some future date, to be considered for reentry. It would be
far better to put that question directly to the jury. Adoption of a
death-in-prison sentence would do exactly that. With death-in-prison
the most severe sanction available, LWOP could not remain as the
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death alternative. Rather, it would only make sense to fix the
alternative sentence at some term of years. The jury’s resolution of
this question is far more salient to all parties affected by the
sentencing decision. It determines whether the defendant will ever be
reunited with members of his family, reintegrate into the community,
or make any future contribution to society beyond prison.
B. Ratcheting Down the Chain of Overpunishment
Finally, replacing the conventional death penalty with death-inprison would have system-wide benefits. America is currently
experiencing an incarceration overload.101 America’s prisons house
an unprecedented number of persons, far more than any other
industrialized nation.102 This development is of recent origin, as the
explosion in prison population occurred almost entirely in the last
forty years. Its causes are much debated, but most commentators
agree that an increase in sentence length has played a major role in
the expansion of prison populations.103
Certainly, there is little doubt that draconian penalties for drug and
gun crimes, mandatory minimum sentences, and dramatically higher
penalties for other particularly reviled types of criminal conduct have
led to longer prison sentences for many convicts. The inflation in the
penal code can be traced, at least in part, to an increase at the very
top of the punishment chain. As Jonathan Simon has argued, the
increased use of “life without parole” sentences has set “the scale of
punishment too high.”104 Because proportionality plays a powerful
role in the construction of our “penal ladder,” and because sentences
for murder, and aggravated murder in particular, represent the peak
of the ladder, the overall shape of the ladder is necessarily impacted
by what happens at the ladder’s highest rungs. Simon argues against
101. See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 27
(2011) (“[T]he American criminal justice system has seen unremitting growth in the number of people
behind bars.”).
102. Id. at 28 (noting that U.S. is “the world’s undisputed leader in incarceration”).
103. See id. at 41 (“In the last three decades, the average time served in the United States has nearly
doubled.”).
104. Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1304 (2011).
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overreliance on LWOP because “if the worst crimes are punished
with spending the rest of your natural life in prison, this provides
virtually no constraint on the overall severity of punishment.”105
But our current punishment practices at the highest rungs of the
ladder are even worse, I think, than what Simon suggests. The
problem, at least conceptually, is that LWOP is not the highest
punishment most jurisdictions currently impose. Death is the highest
penalty imposed. The profusion of LWOP sentences has had the
incredibly corrosive effect on the punishment ladder because LWOP
is currently considered in many jurisdictions not as the imposition of
the most severe punishment, but rather as an act of leniency or
mercy. With LWOP being used as a punishment below the top of the
penal scale, the next lower space on the ladder can be occupied by
penalties that remain truly draconian but which are “lesser” because
they are expressed as a term of years.
Adoption of death-in-prison as a jurisdiction’s highest penal
sanction would help to ameliorate this problem by ratcheting down
the penal scale. This would occur because the main choice that would
be presented to jurors in capital trials would be whether to sentence a
convicted murderer to death-in-prison or, alternatively, a term of
years. By capping the “death” alternative at a term of years, pressure
might be created to lower other term-of-years sentencing provisions
which clearly should be lower in accordance with basic principles of
proportionality. The effect of this downward ratcheting should work
itself throughout the entire penal code, helping to restore some
semblance of sanity to America’s incarceration policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
For many reasons, the conventional death penalty is in retreat.
Four states in recent years have repealed or abolished the penalty,
and other states, including California, may be poised to follow. The
largest obstacle to abolition of the death penalty elsewhere, however,
is its continuing political popularity, no doubt fueled in large part by
105. Id. at 1305.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

37

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5

1120

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

the widely shared belief that murderers deserve “death,” not “life.”
Any abolition proposal, to be effective, will need to address this
political reality. By preserving the rhetorical power of the death
sentence, while modifying its meaning, death-in-prison provides the
means to do so. Death-in-prison permits the state to get out of the
business of affirmative killing while preserving the important moral
message that death, not life, is in fact what the most culpable
murderers deserve. It’s a slow death, to be sure, but not much slower
than what results from the current, dysfunctional, death penalty.
Death-in-prison would save the states money, minimize the risk of
irreparable harm resulting from error, and remove the state from the
business of affirmatively killing. It would moot the spectacle of
frantically-filed petitions and politically-charged commutation
battles, last-minute judicial stays, and media-friendly public vigils for
those condemned to die, all of which inevitably focus the public
spotlight on the prisoner convicted of the crime rather than its victim.
Perhaps most importantly, it would permit a reframing of the
question put to jurors in capital trials. The question would not be, as
it is now, which form of banishment shall be used to permanently
exclude the prisoner from society, but whether permanent exclusion
is the right, and deserved, punishment for the prisoner’s crime. The
side effect of reframing the question would be to ratchet down the
presently over-inflated penal ladder, and permit a downward
refashioning of criminal punishment at all levels. For all these
reasons, death-in-prison is the right death penalty compromise.
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